diaskz » 25 ноя 2019, 16:10
One of the main questions surrounding Jose Mourinho’s appointment at Tottenham Hotspur was whether he was capable of learning from his own failures. The 3-2 victory over West Ham, however, suggested something different – that he’s capable of learning from others’ successes.
One of the key developments of recent years has been the increasing tendency for title-winning sides to form an intriguing structure when in possession – essentially a 3-2-5. Three centre-backs spreading across the pitch, two holding midfielders protecting them closely and guarding against counter-attacks, with five attackers stretching the opposition back four.
No side literally plays a 3-2-5 formation, of course. But Antonio Conte’s Chelsea side, 3-4-3 in conventional terms, were so successful because their wing-backs formed a front five, often creating situations where a wing-back was free as a ‘man over’ after attacking down the opposite flank. Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City often create a similar structure in a different way – sometimes 3-2-5, sometimes 2-3-5 – with Kevin De Bruyne and David Silva pushing forward to become bonus forwards, and the full-backs drifting into midfield.
There were few signs that Mourinho was attempting to use this system during his spell at Manchester United, but from the outset at Tottenham this was the most noticeable aspect of his approach. Mourinho formed the 3-2-5 in an asymmetrical way: from a starting system of 4-2-3-1, left-back Ben Davies tucked inside to become an extra centre-back, while right-back Serge Aurier pushed forward to become a right-winger. Their respective heat maps illustrate this well. Davies played a left-centre role and rarely ventured into the final third…
…whereas Aurier was generally located down the flank, and pushed forward towards the byline.
There’s nothing particularly unusual about Aurier attacking more than Davies, of course. The Ivorian is an overlapping full-back who impresses more with his crossing than his defending, whereas the Welshman is a steady, reliable defender who has often played as a left-sided centre-back for his national side.
But this was more than simply one going and one staying – it was a deliberate change of system within possession. Spurs’ right-winger – Lucas Moura – during the opening stages, would tuck inside to become an inside-right, allowing Aurier to hold the width. On the other flank, Son Heung-min would remain wide left. Dele Alli floated around to the left of Harry Kane, meaning Spurs’ forward line was effectively, from left to right, Son, Alli, Kane, Lucas, Aurier.
Here’s a good example, from midway through the first half. Sanchez and Davies are on the sides of a three-man defence, allowing Spurs to circulate the ball around West Ham’s attackers. Davies and Sanchez found themselves in space to play good passes into attacking positions – Davies played some good penetrative balls into the forwards, while Sanchez usually looked out wide for Aurier.
They’re protected by Winks and Dier sitting in very cautious positions – neither attempted to break forward and link with the forwards. Winks’ passing was somewhat more accurate than Dier’s, but both provided some important defensive contributions.
Then, further forward, you can see the front five. Aurier has pushed forward into a position where he’s actually the most advanced Tottenham player, with Son (who has temporarily switched positions with Lucas) playing inside. West Ham never managed to cope with this: their only solution was Felipe Anderson trotting back and effectively becoming a left-back in a five-man defence, which meant their chief counter-attacker wasn’t in a position to launch breaks.
Another benefit of this system was the fact that the use of two players in the channels either side of Kane meant the West Ham defenders were often concerned with their running in behind, allowing Kane to drop off and receive the ball in space. Here’s a similar situation from earlier in the game – the three-man defence evident again, then Winks and Dier in their usual holding positions.
Further forward, Alli and Son are almost occupying two defenders apiece with their positioning in the channels, which means Spurs find space almost everywhere else – Kane by dropping deep into the midfield zone, Lucas on the left, and Aurier on the far side. Kane pings one of his typical diagonal passes out towards Lucas.
The policy of pushing Aurier forward down the right paid dividends for Spurs’ third goal. Again, the two-man midfield is in place, with three defenders behind them. Alli has dropped off into the midfield zone here, but again the narrowness of Lucas allows Aurier space down the right. After Winks feeds Aurier, he crosses for Kane to convert at the far post.
The biggest positive for Tottenham, though, was the performance of Alli in the No 10 role. It seemed likely he would thrive under Mourinho, whose previous comments about what he wants from that player – an eight-and-a-half without possession, a nine-and-a-half with possession – tally nicely with Alli’s typical qualities as a No 10.
But here, Alli shone because he played the No 10 role like he was a proper No 10, doing the things we don’t usually associate with him. That was obvious in the opening stages with two incidents where Kane was caught offside, but nevertheless demonstrated Spurs’ intentions.
Three minutes in, Davies arrowed a pass from his left-sided centre-backs into Alli between the lines…
…and the amount of space Alli finds is incredible. From there, he dribbles forwards and slips in Kane, who hammers the ball into the net. He’s correctly flagged offside.
An almost identical move happened two minutes later. Davies again playing the pass, Alli again in an inside-left position…
…and Alli playing almost exactly the same ball for Kane, who is again offside.
And eventually this resulted in Spurs’ opener, when Winks fed a simple pass into the feet of Alli between the lines…
…and he looked up and slipped in Son, who turned onto his left foot and smashed the ball past Roberto, setting Spurs on their way.
The final scoreline reflects the fact that Tottenham allowed West Ham back into the game, probably through a combination of tiredness and simply poor defending.
But few doubt Mourinho’s ability to drill his defence. The main doubts were about whether his tactical approach has evolved to keep pace with the modern game, and whether he can get the best from his attackers. So far, the signs are very promising.